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requirements,  rediscounts,  and  open  market  operations.  However,  the 
government does continue to have considerable influence over the allocation 
of bank credit. It has intervened heavily to restructure industries which built 
up  overcapacity during  the  Big  Push.  As  was  shown  in  table  11.8, this 
implied a shift in credit allocation bank to heavy industry during 1985. 
Thus, Korea has made some steps toward financial market liberalization in 
equalizing borrowing costs across industries. Furthermore,  as Cole and Cho 
(1986) point  out,  the  expansion of  the only  partially  regulated NBFI  has 
contributed  to  a  de  facto  liberalization  of  the  overall  financial  system. 
However,  authorities  have  proceeded  cautiously,  continuing  to  influence 
credit allocation. In this sense, the policy shifts may have been more a matter 
of  degree than an “about  face”  in direction. This viewpoint is advanced by 
Y.  C. Park (1985a). It is too early to evaluate the results of the liberalization, 
or to attempt to draw lessons from the experience.  Korea may  soon have 
some  interesting lessons  to  teach  about  the  economic  consequences  of  a 
controlled financial liberalization. 
12  Income Distribution 
As  we  have  studied  in  detail  in  previous  chapters,  Korea  underwent  a 
successful  macroeconomic  adjustment  while  maintaining  high  rates  of 
growth. In  many cases,  rapidly expanding developing countries have been 
able to achieve remarkable increases in per capita incomes, but one of the 
costs has  been the deterioration of  an already skewed income distribution. 
Consequently, the gains have bypassed a large part of the population. This 
chapter examines distributive aspects of Korea’s experience from the  1960s 
to the 1980s. 
There have been a number of  studies of income distribution in Korea. We 
will refer to them throughout the chapter. Those focusing on the first half of 
Korea’s  rapid  growth  (through  the  early  1970s)  include  Adelman  and 
Robinson (1978), Rao (1978), Renaud (1976) and Mason et al. (1980). The 
studies consistently found that  income  was  equitably distributed  in  Korea 
relative to other developing countries, and that Korea’s economic growth did 
not  require or result in a deterioration.  In  fact, the rapid economic growth 
fueled by expansion of labor-intensive export sectors was widely believed to 
have improved the distribution of income during this period. However, later 
studies  caused  considerable  concern  among  policymakers  because  they 
seemed to show a noticeable deterioration of  income distribution during the 
1970s. See, for example, Choo (1977), Szall (1981), and Jung (1982). 301  KoredChapter  12 
Ideally, our discussion would review measures of  income inequality from 
the early 1960s to the present so as to examine changes during the economic 
development. Unfortunately, available studies do not provide consistent time 
series over the entire period. We  have chosen to rely extensively on estimates 
from Choo (1977,  1978, 1985) because they provide consistent series over 
the longest time period (1965-82).  The EPB uses Choo’s figures as official 
figures.  They  are  also  quoted  in  the  World  Bank’s  World  Development 
Reports.  Data  on  income  distribution typically  suffer  fram  a  number  of 
shortcomings, and Korean data are no exception. While there are certainly 
problems  with  existing  statistics,  it  is  reassuring  that  there  is  a  general 
consensus-most  of  the other studies mentioned portray similar trends. 
Figure 12.1 shows Choo’s estimates of Gini coefficients and of the decile 
distribution ratio (the ratio of  the income share of  the bottom 40 percent to 
that of  the top 20 percent, henceforth denoted as DDR). We  follow Choo in 
identifying four time periods which are evident from the graph: an  initial 
stage, a second period of  slight improvement (1965-70),  a third period in 
which the distribution of  income deteriorated (1970-76),  and a final period 
in which the deterioration was reversed (1976-82). 
This chapter is divided into five remaining sections. The next four sections 
examine the four time periods. In each case, we discuss the probable factors 
which contributed to  changes in  distribution. The  final section turns  to  a 
comparison  of  Korea  with  other countries.  Using  cross-country data,  we 
examine the widely held  view  that Korea has maintained one of  the most 
equitable income distributions among developing countries. 
Year 
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Measures of income inequality: Gini coefficients and decile distribu-  Fig. 12.1 
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12.1  The Initial Stages 
A  consensus view  is that  Korea began its rapid  industrialization with  a 
relatively equitable distribution of income. As one indication, in table 12.1 
we  compare Gini coefficients for selected countries.’  In addition to Korea 
and  other  developing countries  at  early  stages of  development,  we  have 
included  figures for  Japan  and  the  United  States.  With  the  exception of 
Yugoslavia, the  only  socialist country represented,  Korea  has  the  lowest 
coefficient.  It  is  substantially  below  the  measure  for  other  developing 
countries, and comparable to the measure for Japan. The rest of this section 
investigates some  of  the  social  and  historical  factors  which  are  widely 
believed  to  explain  the  relative  equality  at  the  initial  stages  of  Korea’s 
development. 
12.1.1  Homogeneous People 
In  many  countries,  a  significant  portion  of  the  inequalities  in  the 
distribution of  income  are  associated with  cultural,  religious,  and  social 
differences  in  the  population.  In  contrast,  Korean  society  is  extremely 
homogeneous,  without  ethnic  minorities,  distinct  military  or bureaucratic 
classes, or divisive political loyalties. Income differences arising from these 
factors have been essentially nonexistent. 
12.1.2  Japanese Colonization 
During the Japanese occupation, ownership of property and accumulation 
of wealth by  Koreans was severely limited. About 90 percent of the nation’s 
industrial assets were managed by  the Japanese. Most Koreans were poor, 
Table 12.1  Gini Coefficients at Initial Stages of Development 














































Source:  Ahluwalia and Chenery (1974, 42). 
*These figures are from Renaud (1976, 1 I). 303  KoredChapter 12 
essentially relegated  to  second-class citizens.  With the  withdrawal of  the 
Japanese after the Second World  War,  most of  the assets which had  been 
owned by the Japanese came into the hands of the Government. These assets 
were  then  distributed to  the  private  sector over a  period  of  more than  a 
decade. 
12.1.3  Land Reforms 
After World  War  11,  the economy of  South Korea was critically tied  to 
agriculture, so that equality in the distribution of  income depended largely 
on  the  distribution  of  agricultural  assets,  especially  land.  Therefore, 
extensive land reforms after the war played  a central role in  flattening the 
distribution of  wealth. These reforms are often viewed as the key factor in 
explaining Korea’s relatively equitable distribution. 
Reforms under the auspices of the U.S.  military government, beginning in 
1947, focused on the redistribution of  government-owned and  vested land. 
In 1949 the newly established Korean government undertook the redistribu- 
tion of  land owned by  big farmers and absentee landlords.2 The substantial 
impact of  these reforms can be seen in figure 12.2. The main beneficiaries 
were the tenants to whom the land was distributed. In  1947 only  17 percent 
of  rural households fully owned the land they farmed. By  1960 this figure 
had  risen  to  74 percent.  There are no available data to compare  the  size 
distribution of fm  income before and after the two land reforrns. However, 
the  change  in  the  structure  of  land  ownership  strongly  suggests  an 
Year 
EZZ  Full Owner  hz9 Owner-Tenant  Tenant 
Fig. 12.2  Land ownership composition of rural households 
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improvement  in  the  distributive  equity  within  the  agricultural  sector  as a 
result of the reforms. 
12.1.4  Korean War 
Korea experienced  another ‘‘wholesale redistribution”  of material wealth 
and  capital  in  the  Korean  War  (1950-52).  Over  40  percent  of  the 
manufacturing  facilities  and  20  percent  of  the  net  capital  stock  were 
destroyed.  The presumption  is that the damages were especially detrimental 
to the upper echelons, where the ownership of these assets was concentrated 
and, therefore, that one effect of  the war was to flatten  the distribution  of 
nonagricultural  assets.  Also,  as  is often the case during war,  the terms of 
trade turned in favor of the relatively poor agricultural sector and against the 
nonagricultural  sector. This is also believed  to have decreased intersectoral 
inequalities. 
12.1.5  Illegally Accumulated  Wealth 
Large amounts of wealth had been accumulated by a favored few during 
the  1950s. The beneficiaries  included  individuals  who had  profited  during 
wartime  business  activities  and  corrupt  officials  of  the  Syngman  Rhee 
regime  who had  profited  from disposing public  and  vested  property, from 
bribes and tax evasion, and so on. 
In  the  early  1960s, backed  by  the military,  the  new  government took 
strong measures to confiscate illegally accumulated wealth.  Even though the 
initial penalties of  more than 20 billion won were reduced to 4 billion won, 
the total  amount of  confiscated  wealth  was significant.  It represented  16.6 
percent  of  total  corporate  savings  in  1962 and  10.3 percent  in  1963. A 
transfer  of  this  magnitude  also  contributed,  at  least  temporarily,  to  a 
reduction in disparity. However, the implied improvement in the distribution 
of wealth would have been more substantial if the transfer had come from the 
most wealthy owners and businessmen, many of whom were in the emerging 
manufacturing sectors. 
12.1.6  Relatively Fluid Society 
Two  final  factors,  inherited  from  the  colonial  period,  contributed  to 
Korea’s relatively equitable distribution: the Japanese system of government 
based  primarily  on cooperation  and merit  and a modern  education  system. 
Koreans have a strong traditional  drive for learning, and enrollments at the 
primary,  middle,  and  high  school  levels  have  consistently  been  high. 
Furthermore, the Korean system earns high marks for maintaining relatively 
equal educational opportunity. 
12.2  Period of Improvement, 1965-70 
Countries  often  experience a  deterioration  in  the  distribution  of  income 
during the early stages of  development. As was shown in figure 12.1, Korea 305  KoredChapter 12 
experienced a slight improvement. The Gini coefficient fell from 0.344 in 
1965 to 0.332 in  1970. In this section we examine some of the contributing 
factors. 
12.2.1  Employment Creation 
Korea’s rapid growth, fueled by  the promotion of labor-intensive exports, 
successfully provided jobs for a growing labor force, reducing unemploy- 
ment and underemployment. Some key labor market statistics for 1963-70 
are  given  in  table  12.2.  The  figures  show  the  rapid  decrease  in  the 
unemployment rate from 8.2 percent in 1963 to just 4.5 percent in 1970. The 
reduction is attributable primarily to a dramatic decrease in unemployment in 
the nonagricultural sector from 16.4 percent in  1963 to 7.4 percent in  1970. 
The  numbers  look  all  the  more  impressive given  that  the  reduction  was 
achieved while the labor force was growing at an annual rate  of  2.1-3.5 
percent.  Employment creation  in  the  manufacturing and  social  overhead 
capital  (SOC)  sectors  was  explosive.  Jobs  in  manufacturing grew  at  an 
average annual rate  of  11.2 percent during  1963-70,  while jobs  in  SOC 
grew at an average rate of 9.5 percent. 
Table  12.3,  in  which  we  summarize  the  contribution  of  commodity 
exports to sectoral employment, is even more revealing. In manufacturing, 
for example, exports accounted for just 3 percent of  employment in  1960. 
This had  increased to 25 percent by  1970. 
Job creation in the urban  sector meant a significant improvement in  the 
distribution of income among employees. This point is made clearly in table 
12.4, in which we compare changes in Gini coefficients over time. The figures 
are disaggregated into three groups: rural workers, employees, and employ- 
ers. The figures show that in 1965 employees were the group with the greatest 
within-group inequality  (0.399).  By  1970 the  figures  show  considerable 
improvement-the  Gini coefficient had fallen to 0.304, which was well below 
the estimate of  overall inequality (0.332). 
Table 12.2  The Korean Labor Market, 1963-70  (in percentages) 
Unemployment Rate  Underemployment Rate* 
Year  Labor Force Growth Rate  Farm  Nonfarm  Total  Farm  Nonfarm  Total 
1963  2.1  2.9  16.4  8.2  6.3  1.9  4.4 
1964  2.2  3.5  14.4  7.7  6.9  1.7  4.1 
1965  2.3  3.1  13.5  1.4  6.2  1.3  4.1 
1966  3.3  3.1  12.8  7.1  7.3  1.1  4.5 
1961  2.4  2.3  11.1  6.2  6.2  0.9  3.1 
1968  2.4  1.9  9.0  5.1  4.9  0.8  2.9 
1969  2.8  2.2  7.8  4.8  3.2  0.5  1.8 
1910  3.5  1.6  7.4  4.5  4.7  0.8  2.1 
Source:  EPB. Annual Report on the Economically Active, Population Survey, and Major Statistics of  Korean 
Economy, for relevant years. 
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Table 12.3  Contribution of  Exports to Sectoral  Employment (in thousands of persons) 
Primary  Manufacturing  SOC snd Service  Whole Industry 
Year  Total  Exports  Total  Exports  Total  Exports  Total  Exports 
1960  4,680  56  471  15  1,871  5  7.028  76 
1963  4,864  96  610  39  2,158  11  7,662  146 
1966  4,956  104  833  130  2,634  36  8,423  270 
1968  4,907  118  1,176  199  3,972  53  9,155  371 
1970  5,027  175  1,284  319  3,434  88  9,745  583 
Source:  Hong (1980,  84) 
Note:  Total employment represents total number of  employed persons,  while number of  workers related to 
exports is on a man-year basis. 
Table 12.4  Gini Coefficients by Sector, 1965-82 
Overall  Rural Workers  Employees  Employers 
Year  Gini  %  Gini  %  Gini  %  Gini  % 
1965  0.344  -  0.285  -  0.399  -  0.384  - 
1970  0.332  -3.5  0.295  3.5  0.304  -23.8  0.353  -8.1 
1976  0.381  14.8  0.327  10.8  0.355  16.8  0.449  27.2 
1982  0.357  -6.3  0.306  -6.4  0.309  -13.0  0.447  0.0 
Source:  Derived from Choo (1985,  12-  15). 
The government also initiated efforts to expand job opportunities to those 
who  were  not  so  easily  absorbed  by  job  creation  in  urban  areas.  For 
example, the underemployed constituted 6-7  percent of the total agricultural 
labor force. The comparable figure for the nonagricultural sector was  1-2 
percent.  The  opposite  was  true  of  measured  unemployment,  which  was 
much  higher  in  the  nonagricultural  sector.  The  government  provided 
additional job opportunities, primarily in  the agricultural sector during the 
off-peak season. The public works programs included land reclamation, land 
improvement, reforestation, multiplication of  marine resources,  and feeder 
road  construction.  By  the  late  1960s, the  underemployment rate  in  the 
agricultural sector had fallen to 3-4  percent. 
In sum, the labor-intensive, export-led growth generated enough new jobs 
to absorb the growing labor force as well as the unemployed nonagricultural 
workers. The government made deliberate efforts  to  reduce underemploy- 
ment in the agricultural sector. Employment opportunities continue to be a 
very important factor in explaining Korea’s relatively equitable distribution. 
12.2.2  The Terms of  Trade 
Existing evidence suggests that although differences between the relatively 
poor  rural  sector  and  the  wealthier  industrial  sector  have  contributed  to 
overall inequality, between-group inequality has traditionally been much less 307  KoredChapter 12 
important that within-group inequality in Korea.  The evidence also points to 
some narrowing of the differences during the 1960s. 
One development which is consistent with a reduction in the intersectoral 
inequity during this period is the trend in  the terms of  trade between the 
primary and manufacturing sectors. We  take the wholesale price index (WPI) 
for agricultural and marine foods as a proxy for prices in the primary sector, 
and the WPI for other goods as a proxy for manufacturing prices. The figures 
are given in table 12.5. The table also provides the weights of each sector to 
show the changes in the economic structure. While the share of the primary 
sector  fell  by  nearly  50  percent,  from  34.5  to  17.8  percent,  its  prices 
increased more than fivefold from 1960 to 197 1. The other goods price index 
only tripled over the same period. With the exception of  1964-65,  the terms 
of  trade continually moved in favor of  the primary sector. The government 
also  contributed  a  little  to  improving  the  living  standards of  the  rural 
population. Although its primary focus was the promotion of  industrializa- 
tion  during  the  1960s,  it  did  undertake the  following measures to  help 
farmers.  It  helped  to  settle  usurious  debts  incurred  by  farmers.  It 
increased the availability and  supported the prices of  chemical fertilizers, 
insecticides, and water pumps. It  also introduced high-yield rice and cash 
crops. These policies  helped to  increase productivity and  to improve the 
living standards of  the lower income classes in the agricultural sector. 
12.3  Period of Deterioration, 1970-76 
As discussed in  the introduction, the distribution of  income deteriorated 
substantially in the 1970s. The Gini coefficient increased by  15  percent from 
Table 12.5  Trends in the Terms of Trade between the Primary and Manufacturing 
sectors 
Agricultural and Marine Foods  Other Goods  Term? of  Trade 
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1.07  1.07 
1.07  1  .00 
1.40  1.31 
1.30  0.93 
1.17  0.90 
1.18  1.01 
1.24  1.05 
1.31  1.06 
1.46  1.11 
1.53  1.05 
1.76  1.15 
Source:  Derived from BOK, Economic Sfatistics Yearbook, various years. 
Note:  Terms of  trade  1 was calculated using the WPI of  1960 as the base. Terms of  trade 2 was calculated 
using the WPI of  the preceding year as the base. 308  Susan M. Collins and Won-Am Park 
0.332 in  1970 to 0.381  in  1976. The deteriorating  trend  was  also clearly 
reflected  in  a  public  survey  conducted  by  Hoon  Yu  (1979),  which  is 
summarized in table  12.6. Most of the respondents believed that there was a 
severe gap between the wealthy  and the poor groups in the society.  In this 
section, we examine some of the factors which are likely to have led to the 
increased inequality. 
12.3.1  Growth of Big Business 
As  a  catalyst  for  economic  growth, the  Korean  government  thought  it 
advantageous to promote the growth of business conglomerates so as to take 
advantage  of  economies  of  scale and  to generate  rapid  growth  and  ample 
employment opportunities. The government provided large export firms with 
various incentives and preferential arrangements.  It made disproportionately 
large amounts of domestic and foreign capital available at lower interest rates 
and  negotiated  abroad  for  foreign  capital.  It  provided  other  financial 
incentives including tax reductions and/or exemptions. It also provided large 
firms with various kinds of technical and infrastructure support. 
While these  incentives  certainly  helped  to encourage  exports,  they  also 
led  to  the  concentration  of  economic  activity  among  a  few  private 
conglomerates,  the chaebol. Figure  12.3 illustrates the increased concentra- 
tion during the  1970s. As a percentage of GDP, value added accounted for 
by  the chaebol roughly  doubled between  1973 and  1978. Table  12.7 shows 
that  concentration  was  especially  great  in  the  manufacturing  sector.  Value 
added of businesses in manufacturing controlled by the largest five chaebols 
reached  a  staggering  18.4 percent  of  GDP  by  1978, and  by  the  largest 
forty-six, 43.0 percent of GDP. Even more striking is the fact that the figure 
grew at an average annual rate of 35.7 percent,  more than twice the average 
annual GDP growth rate, which Sakong (1980) lists as 17.2 percent.  D. M. 
Kim  (1979, 288) estimates  that  inequality  arising  from the  manufacturing 
sector  accounted  for  45.6 percent  of  the  overall  inequality  in  1971, but 
increased to 63.8 percent by  1977. 
These developments had severe effects on small businesses. The shortage 
of  capital reduced rates of productivity and decelerated the growth of  value 
added.  As  a  result,  intersectoral  inequality  among  employers  deepened 
Table 12.6  Views on the Level of Income Inequality in Korea 
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greatly.  As  was  shown  in  table  12.4, the  Gini  coefficient  for  employers 
increased  by  27.2 percent  from  0.353  in  1970 to 0.449 in  1976. Choo's 
( 1978) Theil  decomposition  analysis  also  revealed  that  inequality  among 
employers was  the  largest component of overall income  inequality  in this 
period. 
12.3.2  Rural-Urban Migration 
The rapid growth of  income and the greater employment opportunities in 
urban  areas resulted  in  a  large  continuous migration  from  rural  to urban 
areas.  Szalls  (1981) points  out that  the  number of  workers  in  rural  areas 
increased by only 0.5 percent annually during 1970-79,  while the number in 
Table 12.7  Value Added by Chaebols in the Manufacturing Sector 
Value  Added 
Percentage of  GDP  Annual Growtha 
Chaebols  1913  1918  1973-78 
Top 5  8.8  18.4  35.7 
Top 20  21.8  33.2  21.5 
Top  10  13.9  23.4  30.0 
Top 46  31.8  43.0  24.4 
Source:  Sakong (1980, 6). 
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urban areas increased by  6.1 percent. However, the increased labor force in 
urban  areas  was  primarily  an  increase  of  low-skilled  workers  with  low 
wages. 
Figure 12.4 presents the results from Suh's (1980) study on poverty trends 
in  Korea during  1965-76.  The figure reinforces the finding that  urbanites 
were the main beneficiaries of  the rapid industrialization during the  1960s. 
The percentage of urban households classified as poor decreased from 54.9 
percent in  1965 to  16.2 percent in 1970.4 However, the figure rose to  18.1 
percent in  1976. More revealing is the fact that the distribution of  the poor 
shifted dramatically toward the urban areas during the  1970s. In  1970 only 
28.1 percent of  the total poor households were in urban areas. This figure 
had increased to an astonishing 61 percent only five years later. 
It is also important to point out that  income inequality deepened in the 
industrial sector.  As  shown  in  table  12.8, the  distribution has  been  less 
equitable in  the  nonagricultural sector than  in  the  agricultural sector, and 
increasingly so.  The  nonagricultural DDR  was  80 percent  of  agricultural 
DDR in  1970, and had fallen to 66 percent by  1976. This sectoral difference 
implies that the exodus from rural to urban areas contributed to an increase 
in overall inequality. 
The influx into urban areas also caused serious difficulties and bottlenecks 
as the social infrastructure failed to keep pace with growing needs. Problems 
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Fig. 12.4  Poor households: percentage of total households and urban-rural 
distribution 
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Table 12.8  Income inequality by Sector’ 
Agriculture  Nonagriculture 
Year  Gini  DDR  Theil (%)  Gini  DDR  Theil (a) 
1965  0.29  0.59  36.0  0.41  0.30  55.9 
1970  0.30  0.55  24.5  0.35  0.44  63.1 
1976  0.33  0.48  24.6  0.42  0.32  69.4 
1982  0.31  0.54  13.6  0.37  0.41  84.9 
Source:  Choo (1985, 12-16). 
*The balance is the Theil share of  between-sector inequality. 
facilities, and recreation. Shortages in housing, for example, contributed to 
rampant  speculation  in  real  estate,  with  the  relatively  privileged  classes 
capitalizing on the opportunities. Overemphasis on growth with inadequate 
attention to the development of  infrastructure meant that available services 
were  poorly  distributed,  with  the  upper  income  groups  in  urban  areas 
receiving a disproportionate share. This also contributed to a deterioration in 
the pattern of  distribution. 
12.3.3  The Reduction of  Unemployment 
In the previous section, we noted that during the 1960s, rapidly declining 
unemployment and underemployment rates especially reduced intrasectoral 
inequality  between  employees.  However,  both  rates  seemed  to  reach 
minimum levels at the beginning of the 1970s. Employment hovered around 
‘‘full employment”  throughout the  1970s until  the crisis of  1980. Thus, 
there is little evidence that the labor-intensive, export-led growth continued 
to generate improvements in  the intrasectoral distribution of  income during 
this period. 
12.3.4  Government Control of Labor 
In order to maintain competitiveness in  world  markets, the government 
exercised tight  control over labor activities in  key  export  industries. For 
example, it  is  widely  believed that the  leaders and  the activities of  labor 
organizations  have  been  severely  restricted.  Strikes  are  forbidden  in 
industries involving foreign capital. Labor has limited negotiating power in 
those industries under the heaviest control. Consequently, wages are kept 
artificially low  in  these industries compared to elsewhere in the economy. 
Table  12.9 presents average (1976) wages in manufacturing as a percentage 
of the wages in a number of sectors. Manufacturing, which accounts for over 
90 percent of export production, has by far the lowest wages. For example, 
the  average manufacturing wage  was  less than 40  percent of  the  average 
wage in industries related to electricity, gas, and water. Strict control of labor 
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Table 12.9  Wages in Manufacturing Industry as a fircentage of  Wages in Other 
Industries, 1976 
Other Industries  Manufacturing Wages 
Electricity, gas, and water  38.7 
Finance, insurance, real estate, and business service  42.9 
Construction  44.8 
Social and personal service  52.5 
Wholesale and retail trade, and hotels and restaurants  68.7 
Transportation, storage, and communication  80.4 
Mining  78.2 
Source:  EPB, Major Statistics of  Korean Economy, 1986, p. 277. 
industries  seems to have contributed  to greater wage dispersion  during the 
1970s. 
12.3.5  Inflation Rates 
Korea  experienced  relatively  high  rates  of  inflation  during  the  1970s, 
especially after the first oil price shock.  The annual inflation  rate averaged 
19.8  percent.  This  inflation  especially  hurt  relatively  poor,  fixed  wage 
earners because wages are not indexed in Korea, but benefited the relatively 
more  wealthy  property  owners.  Of  particular  note  was  the  rapid  rise  in 
housing prices in the mid- 1970s when speculative real estate investment was 
at  its  peak.  Many  of  the  low  wage  urban  workers  were  unable  to  find 
housing, even on a temporary basis. Inflation also seems to have widened the 
income gap between the middle and the lower working classes. 
12.4  Renewed Improvement, 1976-82 
The trend  toward  increasing  income  inequality  seems  to have  reversed 
during the late  1970s and early  1980s. The Gini coefficient declined  from 
0.391 in  1976 to 0.357 in  1982, while the DDR rose from 0.371 to 0.431. 
This section discusses some of  the structural and macroeconomic factors we 
believe contributed to this improvement. 
12.4.1  The Wage Structure 
As  we  saw  in  table  12.4,  the  most  important  factor  in  explaining 
improvements in the overall distribution of  income was an improvement in 
its  distribution  among  employee  households.  The  Gini  coefficient  for 
employee  households  declined  by  13  percent  from  1976  to  1982.  The 
coefficient for rural households fell by 6.4 percent,  while that for employer 
households hardly changed. 
Since wages and salaries constitute about 90 percent of employee income, 
convergence  of  wages/salaries  among  different  groups  of  employees 
provides  strong  evidence  for  an  improved  distribution  among  employee 313  KoredChapter 12 
households.  Table  12.10,  in  which  we  disaggregate  wages  according  to 
occupational category, provides strong evidence of  such  a convergence- 
there was a drastic shift in the wage structure during 1976-82.  While wages 
in  relatively  high  paying  categories (managers,  professionals,  and  techni- 
cians) increased substantially relative to other categories during  1971  -76, 
this  trend  reversed  during  1976-85.  For  example,  the  average  wage  of 
managers was almost five times that of production workers in 1976, but had 
fallen to  3.4 times  that  of  production workers by  1984. Table  12.11, in 
which we disaggregate wages by  level of education, shows a similar pattern. 
The wage gap between people with different levels of education had declined 
continuously since the mid- 1970s. 
Reasons for the declining wage differential come from both the demand 
and the supply side. After the great expansion of heavy industry and of large 
firms in manufacturing, construction, and finance during the Big Push of the 
1970s, there was a slowdown in  the growth of  demand for managers and 
skilled workers. Furthermore, a nationwide increase in the level of education 
expanded the relative supply of skilled and highly educated workers. 
Table 12.10  Relative Wages by Occupation (production workers = 100) 
Professionals/ 

















































Source: Park  and Castaneda (1987, 33). 
Note:  Wages include regular pay, overtime, and bonus payments. 
Table 12.11  Relative Wages by Education (primary school  = 100) 
College/  Junior  High  Middle 

































Source:  Park  and Castaneda (1987, 34). 
aFrom 1980 on, middle school and below  = 100 314  Susan M. Collins and Won-Am Park 
12.4.2  Price Trends for Agricultural Goods 
Figure 12.5 shows that prices of agricultural goods rose more quickly than 
those  of  nonagricultural  goods.  This  trend  was  accompanied  by  a 
government agricultural policy which maintained a relatively stable ratio of 
the prices paid by  farmers relative to the prices received by  farmers. Also, 
Choo (1985, 22-23)  mentions that the ratio of  off-farm to total income of 
small, land-owning farmers increased from 43.5 percent  in  1976 to  62.3 
percent in  1982. There has also been an increase in average farm household 
income as  a  percentage  of  average urban  household  income,  which  has 
helped to raise the relative living standards of  poor rural households. 
12.4.3  Inflation and Capital Gains 
Stabilization  policies  in  the  early  1980s  concentrated  attention  on 
combating inflation. The impressive results can be seen in table 12.12. Since 
inflation tends to distribute income to property holders and profit earners, the 
arrest of  inflation is likely to have had a positive influence on distribution. 
The government also took steps to control windfall capital gains. A fiscal 
reform  introduced higher rates of  taxation for capital gains and  revenues 
from real estate than for other types of  income. The measures seem to have 
discouraged  the  rampant,  nonproductive, speculative investments  in  real 
estate which we have argued contributed to the deteriorating position of  the 
poor during the mid-1970s. 
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Fig. 12.5  WPI  by sector,  1973-85  (1973 =  100) 
Source:  Bank of  Korea (1986, 221). 315  KoredChapter  12 
Table 12.12  WPI and Seoul CPI Trend, 1974-83 
1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983 
WPI  42.1  26.5  12.2  9.0  11.6  18.8  38.9  20.4  4.7  0.2 
CPI  24.3  25.3  15.3  10.1  14.4  18.3  28.7  21.3  7.2  3.4 
Source:  EPB, Major Szarisrics of  Korean Economy,  1986, pp. 206-  10. 
12.4.4  Welfare Policies for the Urban Poor 
Prior to the mid-l970s, there had  been  little serious government effort 
toward improving welfare programs and implementing welfare laws for the 
poor. Policymakers directed their concern to economic growth and industrial 
development, hoping that the fruits of  growth would  spread to the lower 
income groups. The government was involved in small-scale social welfare 
programs that had been initiated by  foreign agencies. 
Over  time,  the  government  became  more  actively  involved  in  social 
welfare.  It  began  to  set  and  enforce guidelines and  laws;  for  example, 
increasing minimum  wages  and  promoting better working conditions and 
social welfare facilities, etc. It is difficult to ascertain the magnitude of  the 
redistributive measures. However, table 12.13 does indicate that policymak- 
ers  became  increasingly  involved  in  social  and  distributive  aspects  of 
growth.  Total expenditure on  social welfare  programs  rose  from just  20 
percent of total expenditures in the 1970s to over 30 percent in  1980. 
12.5  International Comparisons 
We  conclude this chapter with a discussion of income distribution in Korea 
vis-a-vis the distribution in other countries. There have been a number of other 
cross-country comparisons. Although the studies are typically conscious of 
the  importance of  different stages of  development and  different levels of 
income, one can draw only limited conclusions because of the unreliability 
and inconsistency of  available data. The analysis presented here is certainly 
Table 12.13  Trends in Government Social Welfare Expenditures (in billions of won) 
Category  1974  1978  1982 
Education  154.7  (12.9)  605.0  (13.7)  1,980.5  (17.0) 
Health  13.1  (1.1)  68.3  (1.5)  140.6  (1.2) 
Social Security  61.8  (5.1)  189.2  (4.3)  991.5  (8.5) 
Housing  16.2  (1.3)  55.0  (1.2)  383.4  (3.3) 
Others  11.2  (0.9)  37.0  (0.4)  77.9  (0.7) 
Total  257.0  (21.4)  954.5  (21.7)  3.573.9  (30.7) 
Source:  Suh and Yeon (1986, 5). 
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no exception.  Nonetheless,  the findings are interesting and indicative.  Our 
comparisons are based on data from the World Bank and the IMF. 
We  begin  by  using  Kuznets’  well-known  “U-Shaped  Hypothesis”  as a 
framework to make comparisons across countries. The hypothesis states that 
as a country develops, the distribution of income tends to improve only after 
an initial  phase of deterioration.  One indicator of Korea’s relative position 
comes from a comparison of Korean data at various stages of development to 
the U-shaped curve estimated from a cross section of countries.  We  use the 
ratio of  the income share of the poorest  20 percent of the population to the 
income share of the richest  10 percent  (denoted as RATIO) as a measure of 
inequality.  GNP per  capita  is  used  as a  proxy  for  the  level  of  economic 
development. The figures are listed in ascending order of GNP per capita in 
table  12.14. 
The patterns of income distribution are illustrated in figure 12.6. The plot 
does offer some support for the U-shaped  hypothesis.  In general, countries 
with mid-range GNP per capita tend  to have lower RATIOs than countries 
with lower GNP per capita.  There is no doubt, however, that the countries 
with  the most equitable  distribution  are those  with the  highest  income per 
capita. 
We  explore the relationship  more formally by regressing  the measure of 
inequality  on GNP per capita.  The resulting estimates (using ordinary least 
squares) are given below, with t-statistics  in parentheses. 
RATIO = 1.280 - 0.344 .  log(GNP/Capita)  + 0.025 .  log(GNP/Capita)2 
(4.259)(  -4.156)  (4.591) 
- 
R2 = 0.506;  Standard Error of Estimate  = 0.065; 
Durbin Watson  =  2.212; number of observations  = 47. 
All of the coefficients are significantly different from zero. The estimates do 
indeed  imply  a  U-shaped  relationship.  This  is  evident from  figure  12.6 
which shows both the actual and the estimated RATIO for each country as a 
function  of  its GNP per capita.  For all four years included,  Korea’s actual 
RATIO is substantially greater than the estimate for Korea’s income level. 
A  second  comparison  is  to  examine  the  relationship  between  rates  of 
growth and the  distribution of  income. This is done in  figure  12.7, which 
plots the RATIOs against each country’s average GNP growth rate over the 
five-year  period  ending  in  the  year  in  which  the  RATIO  was  obtained. 
Although  the  figure indicates considerable  diversity, even  among countries 
with similar rates of growth, there seems to be a negative overall correlation 
between  the  two  variables.  The straight  line  in  the  figure  represents  the 
estimated  RATIOs  obtained  from  an  OLS  regression.  Again,  the  four 
RATIOs for Korea are well above the estimated “norm.”  This is particularly 
true of the figure for 1970. 
As  mentioned  at  the  outset,  these  findings  are  based  on  relatively 
simplistic analysis with faulty data. They should be interpreted with caution. 317  KoredChapter 12 
Table 12.14  International Comparison of Income Distribution 
Average 
GNP per  GNP  W  Income  % Income 
Capita  Growth  Owned by  Owned by 
in  1980  (for last  Bottom 20%  Top 10%  A/B 
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Fig. 12.6  Income ratio versus GNP  per capita 
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Fig. 12.7  Income ratio versus average GNP growth over last five years 
However,  it  seems difficult to  refute the view  that Korea's  distribution of 
income has  remained  far better than  the  distribution in  other countries at 
similar levels of  development. Although Korea did experience a period of 
deteriorating distribution during its development, the conclusion that Korea 
achieved rapid growth rates with  relative equity by  international standards 
seems fairly certain. 